Applying Just Culture to improve investment decisions

Showing posts with label 2BE. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2BE. Show all posts

Wednesday, 4 September 2019

FY19 Portfolio update ASX:LBL, SOP, DEM, 2BE, XRF, BSL, SSG

SOP BSL DEM XRF SSG LBL 2BE ASX

04/09/2019

Trav Mays
 


Today I would like to give an update on all the stocks within my portfolio and see how my original thesis has/is playing out. I plan to write another post about other companies that aren’t in my portfolio but I have written about in the past to test my thesis and hopefully learn a bit more. 


I run a very concentrated portfolio because the benefits really resonate with me. I completely understand diversification and its merits, but I struggle to keep up with this many stocks, so adding another 13 or so to get diversified sounds like a nightmare, but each to their own. The figures in the table below are just a snap shot as of end of business day today (04/09/19) and should not be looked at as an indication of performance.

*Weighted average price

LaserBond (ASX:LBL)


I originally made a mistake with LaserBond, to ensure that I learn from it, I have given it its own post, so I won't rewrite that here. You can read all about my mistake here and the original here.

BlueScope Steel (ASX:BSL)


Original thesis can be read here

After going through my analysis I decided to sell BSL today (04/09/19) for $12.33, netting me a return of 11.6% + dividends - brokerage and tax in 9 months, pretty happy with that. The reason I decided to sell is due to increased uncertainty. The trade war continues to drag on, with steel being a key lever both sides are using to hurt the other. BSL has also been spending a lot of money on buybacks, helping to keep the stock price somewhat elevated despite the decrease in profit and predicted large decrease in FY20. If the buyback where to stop before the trade war ends, I would imagine it would hurt the share price in the short term. They have also just started proceedings with the ACCC over alleged steel price fixing. It doesn't sound like they have a very solid case, the ACCC's Chair Mr. Rod Sims stated that due to them only having 6 years to begin civil proceedings and that time is almost up, the "ACCC has determine it is appropriate to commence such proceedings against BlueScope and Mr. Ellis", not the most confident sounding reasoning, but adds to the uncertainty around BlueScope. Whilst I think it is still undervalued, I would rather wait and watch on the sidelines than continue to own a stock whose profits are so heavily tied to the a ongoing disagreement between two of the most powerful people on the planet and get back in if it does happen to go down. 

Synertec (ASX:SOP)


Original thesis can be read here

Synertec looks to be playing out as expected, albeit, slightly postponed, except for their revenue, I didn’t predict anywhere near that big a jump (111.2%). They also recorded decent increases further down the income statement, with EBITDA returning to positive figures that being said, they did produce a loss in FY19 of $85k.

T
he original thesis revolved around a new accounting standard (IFRS 15, introduced on the 1st January 2018) temporarily disguising earnings, which continues to be the case. We can see this by looking at the disconnect between operating cash and EBIT, EBIT for FY19 was a loss of $40k whilst Operating cash was a positive $0.83m. We can also see that despite SOP recording an EBIT loss in FY18 and FY19, cash and cash equivalents has continued to increase. If you have read my initial post, you would have seen the simple calculation process that reveals SOP's true earnings, which accounts for all but 50k of the 2.4m increase in the cash balance, as calculated at HY19. This hidden profit, I believed, would eventually be put through the income statement, boosting profit and would be the catalyst for a ~40% stock price gain. But despite the deferred income decreasing by $2.4m in FY19, SOP produced a loss, so what is going on? 

SOP ASX Synertec Corporation Ltd

I believe the missing profit has been postponed due to some untimely project completion dates; $8.46m worth of projects plus a custody transfer skid were delivered within the first 2 months of FY20. Under IFRS 15, contracts with multiple performance obligations record revenue as each performance obligation is meet, contracts with payments upon completion are recorded "when control of the goods transfer to the customer". Whereas "operating expenses are recognised in profit or loss upon utilisation of the service or at the date of their origin". This means that whilst expenses are recorded as they occur, revenue is recorded only after a milestone is achieved, any cash received before the milestone is recorded as Deferred Income on the balance sheet under Liabilities. As the projects pass their milestones, the deferred income reduces as it is recognised as revenue. The final portion of the revenue both received as cash and recognised on the P&L for the projects finished early FY20, I believe, would have occurred on delivery in FY20, hence the lower deferred income and loss for FY19. While we are not given figures for the custody transfer skid or contract specifics, it's a good bet that they would be settled as cash on delivery, revenue would therefore be recorded in FY20, its costs however, would have all been recorded as they were incurred, the majority of which was in FY19. The same can be said for the performance obligation contracts, the final portion of the payment will be received in FY20, but a large portion of costs would have been expensed in FY19. The 238% increase in the materials and services expense and the 2H19 operating cash loss of $0.42m, I believe, help to validate this point.

SOP ASX Synertec Corporation Ltd

Whilst a good portion of the revenue and profit disconnect can be attributed to the accounting standards and untimely completion dates, part is due to the revenue increase coming from the lower margined fixed priced project segments. This segment's revenue increased by 166%, making up 87.3% of total revenue, whilst their other division, rendering of services, decreased by 13%. It would appear that SOP is pricing their projects with a low margin to help win market share, allowing them to show off their skills and talent and to win customers over. Clearly there is a short window in which a strategy like this can be used, but if used correctly, can really help to boost long term shareholder value. 

SOP continued to invest in themselves during FY19, they in actual fact accelerated their spend, with business development more than doubling and Employee and Super costs increasing by $1.33m or 21%.

I believe SOP is still good value at current prices, they have no debt, are op cash positive and according to their investor presentation have a medium term target of $40m revenue, with above industry average margins. They seem to be focusing on their custody transfer skids as a large driver of growth, a little more sales info about these units, projected sales volume, a ball park sale price and margin would be appreciated. But nothing stood out as a worry for me, so I'm going to continue to hold. The 1H20 report is the one I am really interested in, within it will hopefully be a return to healthy margins and proof of my thesis playing out, bring with it the ~40% gain I'm predicting. Fingers crossed on this one, I do however believe the risk reward ratio is positively skewed in my favor. 

Shaver Shop (ASX:SSG)


Original thesis can be read here and the half year result here

Shaver Shop along with a number of other large retailers had a pretty good year. Despite the constant retail apocalypse discussions, SSG grew NPAT by 6%, they hit the lower end of their EBITDA guidance, 12.5m and increased their online sales by 30%, which contributed 12.6% to total sales. But more importantly, they grew LFL sales, 1.1% overall and 4.8% when you exclude Daigou sales.


Over the year they have made a number of improvements, they opened 6 new stores and bought back one franchise. They also improved their website, initiated a number of online incentives and completed 8 full store refits. 

Shaver shop ASX SSG annual report

Using the PEG ratio, SSG looks priced a little bit higher than it should be, currently sitting on a PEG of 1.5, when using FY19's earnings growth rate of 6% (P/E = 9.14), but is this level of growth justified? So far in FY20, they have increased LFL sales by 9.5% and bought back 2 franchises. Within FY20 they are planning on increasing their marketing spend back up to FY18 levels and refitting 5 - 10 stores with the new design. The franchise buy backs are especially important as they are typically in locations that generate higher sales per store. So they are definitely off to a good start to the year. So it does seem like 6% is a bit low, but it is far too early to tell, as with most retailers, so much of their revenue comes from the holiday season, that any prediction without a little bit of holiday data is pretty much pointless.

During the conference call, Mr. Cameron Fox, current CEO, made an interesting comment. He stated that SSG are using each store as a type of warehouse, whereby as an item is purchased online, the sale order is sent to the store nearest to the customers location, who then, during down periods, package and post the online sales. Clearly this is an excellent idea to try and reduce postage times and costs, keep employees busy during down times and to combat Amazon's 2 day delivery, but one that would need to be managed really well. 

Given all this, I am going to continue to hold and watch, they are paying out a pretty healthy dividend, so assuming everything stays the same or doesn't deteriorate too much and I don't have any other company I want to buy, I'm happy to hold.

De.mem (ASX:DEM)


Original thesis can be read here

DEM on the surface didn't have a very good half, revenue decreased by 37% (HY19 $3.7m) whilst their NPAT loss more than doubled (HY19 -$1.8m). But when we have a look a little further down in the report, at the cash flow statement, a different story emerges. DEM increased their receipts from customers by 9.3% (HY19 $5.08m) and whilst they produced a operating loss of $0.8m the vast majority of it, ~74%, was from the first quarter, showing that they are making progress towards becoming operating cash flow positive. Not only that, but DEM is predicting to surpass CY18's revenue of $10.5m, with $9.5m worth of revenue having already been secured.

Whilst all of this is great, my key take away from the report is that DEM has begun to untether themselves from the mining and infrastructure industries whilst expanding their geographical footprint. DEM states that "while the vast majority of CY 2018 revenues were generated from the mining/resources and infrastructure segments, the revenue mix for CY 2019 includes some contributions from projects in the food & beverage sector". They went on to state that "a key pillar of the expansion strategy for 2019 is to aggressively target the high growth food & beverage and agricultural sectors across Australia". DEM is also expanding their geographical footprint, having set up two new offices in Adelaide and Melbourne, they also acquired PumpTech (07/08/19), Tasmania's equivalent of Akwa-Worx. A recent announcement  really highlights these two points. DEM reported on the 28/08 that they had received two purchase orders for a total of $0.35m, the first order was for a water treatment system in WA, ordered by a WA government organisation, whereas the second order was for a waste water treatment system for a company working in the Food & Beverage industry based in the Pacific Islands region. Whilst the value is not very high, it shows that they are making further progress towards these two goals.

DEM ASX De.mem annual report

Nothing in the report stood out to me as a worrying sign. I believe DEM is still great value at today's prices and will be able to generate a shareholder return around the 30 - 40% mark in the not to distant future, with the potential for a lot more over the coming years if management performs well and they get a bit of luck on their side. To achieve this, I believe DEM will need to continue to ride the increasing infrastructure spend all the while investing the proceeds back into the business, helping to further expand their customer base industrially and geographically. Signs of DEM departing from this plan is what I will be looking for in the future, but as they currently stand, I am going to happily continue to hold.

TUBI (ASX:2BE)


Original thesis can be read here

Tubi performed really well over the year, they exceeded my revenue prediction by $4.5m, increasing year over year by 82%. They did however fall slightly short on my NPAT prediction, missing it by $0.17m. Their NPAT figure however includes a $0.95m listing expenses, when we adjust for this, EBIT increases to $3m (9.74% margin) and after we remove $0.92m of tax (30% tax rate), NPAT increases to $2.15m (6.8% margin), ~$0.5m higher than I had predicted.

The reason my prediction missed the mark by so much, was due to 2BE generating revenue per month far higher than they have in the past. Over the last 6 months of FY19, Tubi had one plant producing in the Permian Basin which generated $14.4m, or $2.4m per month. My estimate had been the average between the revenue received over the year in NZ and the 2 months in the Permian Basin, $1.65m per month. At the time I was aware that the 2 months in the Permian Basin figure I had used was conservative and would increase as the team became accustom to the factory and site, but I didn't expect that they would be able to increase it by $0.75m.

2be tubi asx report

Along with missing the mark on the rev/month, I was also quite a way off on the sale price of the Iplex unit. Due to me underestimating the amount of revenue per month the plants would generate, I overestimated the cost of the Iplex plant, its actual cost was AUS$9.28m, of which, 40% has already been received with the remaining 60% to be received when the plant is delivered in  FY20.

This report gave us some more valuable information about potential future revenue, so I believe an update of my old projection is warranted. To keep the projection conservative, I won't update the assumptions, despite the fact that the plants are currently ahead of schedule, I will just update the rev/month figure, the Iplex plant sale price and use FY19's adjusted figures. FY20's revenue therefore consists of 18 months (1.5 plants) of production at the new higher rate plus the remaining 60% of the Iplex plant. Whereas FY21's revenue is for 4 plants producing for 12 months, 2 at the new higher rate $2.4/month and 2 at the more conservative lower rate of $1.65m/month. 

2be tubi asx report

The updated information paints 2BE in even better light than my original post. If we look one year out, we have a PEG of 60.7, whereas if we average the next 2 years growth, we have a current PEG of 24.5. Very encouraging figures, especially when we consider that I have not taken into account the Iplex service agreement, the fact that the plants are currently slightly ahead of schedule and my conservative assumptions. I did however make a large amount of assumptions, so this prediction should be looked at with skeptic eyes, you can see how wrong I was last time I tried to predict. Given all this, I believe that the risk reward ratio is currently in my favor and at current prices, continues to offer good value. If you'd like to read more about Tubi, I have referenced and linked Mr. Joshua Baker's report on both XRF and Tubi at the bottom of the XRF section, he goes into more detail about their progress and is an excellent read, highly recommend.

XRF Scientific (ASX:XRF)


Original thesis can be read here

XRF had a bumper of year, having gone through an inflection point, they increased revenue by 20%, NPAT by 109% and Op cash flow by 380%. They also moved closer to turning the German office profitable, recording 2 months in the 2H19 with positive profit.   

Along with this, PBT margins were increased across the board, with the standout being precious metals increasing to 7% and contributing 25% of the total PBT, up from 3% in FY18.

XRF ASX results xrf scientific
XRF ASX results xrf scientific

Ricky (twitter:@galumay) has put forth a number of valid arguments against XRF on twitter over the last couple of months. The two that I believe could pose a serious threat are, the fusion machine's ability to process large quantities and their long life span. As a mine site ramps up production, no additional fusion machines are needed to meet the  higher level of output and with the replacement life cycle being so long, without new mines opening up, the sales growth rate within this segment could slow down or reverse. If we look at XRF's geographical revenue breakdown we can see that within Australia there was a large increase in the Capital Equipment segment, but flat in Consumables. We can lightly infer from this (consumables can be purchased from competitors) that a good portion of these purchases are replacements, which is also confirmed by XRF within the report. Higher commodity prices are currently pushing mining profits up, with the ABC reporting a 12.5% increase over FY18, so assuming this continues we should hopefully see capital equipment profit levels hold steady or slightly increase over the next 2 - 3 years (This is really a guess). XRF have also stated that they are focusing on growing the services and parts divisions and are planning to launch new products in FY20, opening up new organic growth opportunities.

XRF ASX results xrf scientific
Excerpt from XRF Scientific FY19 annual report

The consumables division did well, the continued reduction in Lithium prices helped to push NPAT to record levels, increasing by 35.3%, despite revenue increasing by only 6.16%. Expanding XRF's consumables market share is another area of growth XRF has stated they are targeting. 

As I said earlier, precious metals is the real stand out here, this division appears to be on the cusp of an inflection point and in my opinion is where the future growth will stem from. The German division's progress to becoming profitable has allowed XRF to reduce their precious metal expansion costs by half ($0.3m FY19, $0.743 FY18) and to increase profits to $0.925m, up from $0.556m in FY18.

So what does this mean for XRF? I believe XRF is well positioned to continue to benefit from the pickup in the mining industry, giving them a couple of years of similar or higher capital equipment revenue, this along with their decrease in precious metals expansion costs, higher margins and organic growth opportunities will help to push earning higher into the future. Hopefully, they will pump a good portion of this back into the company helping to expand their product mix through either acquisitions or product development.  They have stated that they are looking to expand internationally and that they are pursuing M&A opportunities, so this is looking promising. The rest will probably be distributed to share holders, as Mr. Joshua Baker states in his recent article "Results Update: Platinum Gilded Numbers & Close to Light at the End of the Tube""I believe the company would be able to make a material capital return to investors via a special dividend, which would also allow XRF to distribute the benefit from the $5.7m in franking credits accrued on the balance sheet".

Given all this, I am happy to hold, but I will be watching for any signs of Ricky's fears playing out. I am however going to push my estimate of the share price up to $0.3, with the possibility of more if management perform well and they continue to have luck on their side.


As always, thanks a lot for reading. I am on Twitter  and Linkedin  if you’d like to connect or would like to chat, it’s always great to meet other ASX investors, especially those who have a different view point and don't forget to subscribe to ensure you don't miss out on my new posts. 


Thanks for reading


Just Culture Investor


Trav Mays


Sources:

1. https://www.livewiremarkets.com/wires/results-update-platinum-gilded-numbers-close-to-light-at-the-end-of-the-tube
2. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-09-02/gdp-economic-growth-slow-down-business-indicators-profit-mining/11471034

The author is a current owner of all shares outlined above, given this, they may be subject to one or a number of biases, more specifically anchoring and/or confirmation bias. This article is neither general nor personal advice and in no way constitutes specific or individual advice. The website and author do not guarantee, and accept no legal liability whatsoever arising from or connected to, the accuracy, reliability, currency or completeness of any material contained on this website or on any linked site. This website is not a substitute for independent professional advice and users should obtain any appropriate professional advice relevant to their particular circumstances. The material on this website may include the views or recommendations of third parties, which do not necessarily reflect the views of the website or author, or indicate its commitment to a particular course of action. Please refer to Disclaimer page for a full list of disclaimers.  

Thursday, 11 July 2019

Tubi or not to be (ASX:2BE)

ASX:2be Modular plant tubi group

12/07/2019

Trav Mays
 



Today we will be looking at Tubi Limited (ASX:2BE) a recently IPO’d growth company with a bright future ahead of it. Whilst reading this, please keep in mind that this is my attempt at evaluating agrowth company, which is not a style of investing that I have a lot of experience with. It was however suggested to me by a very smart investor (Mr. Joshua Baker) and I also saw that “The Gentleman, an ASX growth investor who blogs for Ethical Equities has it in his portfolio, so I thought it was worth a good look.


Before we get started, I would like to expand a little on my thoughts about the difference between value and growth investing.Without growth there isn’t value (other than a pure asset play), the two go hand in hand, as Warren Buffett said in his 1992 annual letter “The two approaches are joined at the hip: Growth is always a component in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose importance can range from negligible to enormous and whose impact can be negative as well as positive”. By calling this company a growth company, I am referring to the fact that there is little to no history for Tubi and with the company changing so dramatically in the near future, the metrics that I normally use are completely useless. So I have instead put a lot more emphasis on trying to predict future growth.

Company

Tubi group (2BE:ASX) is a HDPE pipe manufacturer with a twist, they have created a patented modular manufacturing facility, allowing them to produce their pipe onsite. This has a number of advantages over a conventional fixed factory, the main two are that they can produce longer lengths of pipe, due to them not being limited to available space on truck beds and there is no need for transportation, cutting expenses down immensely. Along with their modular factory, they have the ability to put large diameter (up to 315mm OD) HDPE pipe on a reel for transportation. Whilst not currently patented, this technology is quite unique and gives Tubi access to additional revenue streams.


Tubi was founded in 2009 by Marcello Russo, who up to this point had worked for 15 years as the General Manager of Cromford, a plastic pipe manufacturer. Just 5 years later, they had completed their first plant and successfully manufactured pipe for the British Gas Coal Seam project in Queensland. From here they have gone from strength to strength, below is an excerpt from Tubi’s prospectus.

ASX:2BE Tubi Group
As you can see, after supplying to ISCO Industries, they were awarded the contract to supply the Central Plains New Zealand Irrigation Project, a 10-month long project that supplied irrigation water to farmlands. The success of this project paved the way for the 2 year take or pay contract with MPS Enterprises in the Permian Basin. 7 months later, MPS signed another agreement with Tubi, requesting a second modular facility and another 2-year supply contract. December 2018 was a busy time for Tubi, not only did they secure the second MPS contract, but they sold a modular factory to Iplex to be used exclusively in NZ, commissioned the building of these two plants and Jeff Shorter came on board as CEO.

The sale of the modular plant to Iplex was an Equipment Purchase Agreement, under which, Iplex is prohibited from selling or transferring the plant to any other entity or person or transporting it to another country without consent from Tubi. Along with the Equipment Purchase Agreement, they have signed a 3-year Service Agreement, which pays Tubi a monthly service fee for support of their modular factory. Under the Equipment Purchase Agreement, Iplex has agreed to pay for the modular factory in instalments, with 40% being paid on signing of the agreement (21/12/19), with the rest paid once the plant is delivered to site and successfully passed its SAT (site acceptance test). The modular plants take 9 – 12 months to construct, so the final 60% should be paid sometime in the first half of FY2020.

The contracts with MPS are far simpler, they are your typical 2 year Manufacturing and Supply Agreements (MSA). Within which, Tubi has a protection clause that stipulates that MPS must purchase a minimum quantity of pipe per year. On completion of the contract, the agreement automatically renews for an additional year unless either MPS or Tubi supply advanced notice that the plants are not required. They also give MPS first right of refusal to enter another MSA on any additional mobile plants that are constructed.

Along with securing the two contracts outlined above, in December 2018, they also employed Mr. Jeff Shorter as CEO. Mr. Shorter, a Texas based veteran of over 25 years in the oil and gas, piping and steel industries, holds a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering from Michigan Technological University and a MBA from Youngstown State University. Mr. Shorter begun working at the top level of management in 2002 as VP and GM of Maverick Tube corp. He has since worked at the top level for several companies, most notably Flex Steel pipeline technologies, Tenaris and Sturrock and Robson. There isn’t much info online about Mr. Shorter, but it is clear that he has worked at large organisations in senior positions and compliments the other members of the board’s skills excellently.

Following on from this, Tubi completed a pre-IPO capital raising, issuing 50 million shares at a price of $0.20 per share, raising $10 million. This money was then used to help fund two additional mobile plants (four in total), costing a total of $22 million ($5.5m each).

They then went on to list on the ASX on the 14th June, issuing 28.8 million shares at a price of $0.20 raising $5.76 million, valuing the company at ~$50 million. As opposed to issuing to raise funds for growth or acquisitions, Tubi has listed, primarily, to allow the founder, Mr. Marcello Russo, the opportunity to receive a return on his investment. There are no new shares being issued for the IPO, all 28.8 million shares are coming from Mr. Russo’s slice of the pie, see below, encouragingly, he still owns quite a large percentage. Please note that the no. of shares is a little misleading, Mr. Willsallen and Mr. Tilley both have a stake in the 104,014,980 shares, they don’t both own that amount.

ASX:2BE Tubi Group

Competitive Advantage


Tubi’s mobile plant gives them a number of competitive advantages over the conventional factory, but essentially it comes down to their ability to produce HDPE pipe sections in lengths that exceed 50 feet. Whilst the $/lm (Linear meter) will be higher than a conventional factory, their ability to reduce both transport costs and the number of welds brings them out ahead, by a considerable margin. MWH Global in their document titled “An introduction to the Central Plains Irrigation Scheme” commented that “A major advantage of making pipes on site is the resulting speed of installation, since the number of welding operations (which can take many hours at larger diameters) is reduced by a factor of around 7”.

CS&D Services did a thorough analysis (find it here) of the Central Plaines New Zealand Irrigation Project and found that the number of welds needed was reduced by 80%! When you add this to the transportation savings, Tubi was able to reduce the total projects cost by $3.217m (~16%), a saving of $0.32m per month. CS&D’s breakdown of the costs can be seen below.

ASX:2BE Tubi Group

Along with the cost savings, Tubi has that advantage of being able to set up their self sustained plant in just 2 days anywhere on the planet. They also have both an Australian and an International patent, helping to reduce competition. There is another company called Poly Piping Systems, who also have a mobile HDPE plant, but from what I can tell, despite them holding the patent for mobile plants, they have yet to start any projects. I’m basing this off their website as the only images of the plant are CGI and every other photo is just a stock image. Other companies offer mobile plants, which are essentially mini HDPE factories, requiring concrete foundations and large sheds to be built on site.

Evaluation

As this company doesn’t have a long track record, we will be making a lot of assumptions, but if we are conservative, it should give us a somewhat solid foundation to build our house of cards on 😊.

We will begin the evaluation by approximating the revenue a plant has the capacity to generate in a given year, obviously this will vary depending on the size of the pipe but is a good starting point to begin with. In FY2017, Tubi generated $4.66m in revenue, this was from the initial 3 months of work on the NZ Central Plains Irrigation Project. In FY2018 they had the mobile plant operational for 10 months, 8 months in NZ and the final 2 in Texas working for MPS, generating a total revenue of $17.38 million. As you can see below, they generated a higher amount of revenue per month in FY18, $0.19m more. Unfortunately we can only speculate on the cause of which, it could be from a final push at the NZ site, or the Texas site is producing more costly pipe, fingers crossed for the latter.
ASX:2be Tubi Group
Now that we have established the average amount of revenue one plant can produce in a given year (I’m sure you are all rolling your eyes at the moment, saying “Come on Trav, you can’t extrapolate from 2 data points and then create your whole thesis around that” and you’re right, more data is always better, but as this is all we have, so as long as we don’t let the assumptions get out of hand we should be ok), we can estimate the sale price of the Iplex unit as well as the FY EPS for any combination of plants we can think of.


In HY2019, Tubi generated $17.172m in revenue, which included 40% of the total Iplex unit cost and 6 months of continuous work in Texas. Using the average Rev/month of $1.65m, we can estimate that Iplex paid $18.24m for the unit (That’s a gross profit of $12.74m and a gross margin of 70%).

ASX:2BE Tubi group

Now that we have approximated the cost of the Iplex plant and the potential revenue from a single plant, we can estimate the FY19, FY20 & FY21 EPS and from this it’s FP/E and PEG, with the hope of trying to equate if they are currently under or overpriced. As we have no information regarding the Iplex Service Agreement, I have just left this out, which is most likely making this approximation too conservative, but given the results, I think we can look at it as cream. Other assumptions made are as follows:

1. First plants are constructed and shipped to site before the end of HY20 and the second lot of plants are constructed and producing for the whole of FY21 
2. EBIT margin of 8.8%; taken from their prospectus 
3. Tax rate of 30
4. FY19 revenue is HY19 + 6 months of continuous production of one plant at the average monthly revenue calculated above 
5. FY20 revenue includes 18 months (1.5 plants) of production + the remaining 60% of the Iplex plant 
6. FY21 revenue is from 4 plants producing for 12 months 
7. No new shares are issued
ASX:2be tubi group
Peter Lynch famously said that a company’s P/E ratio should roughly equal the growth rate of the company. Essentially, he is stating that a company’s PEG (Price/Earnings/Growth) rate should be equal to 100 (or 1, depending on your denominator), anything below shows a company that is undervalued whilst over 100 is a company overvalued. The tricky part is choosing the right growth rate, above I have simply used the approximated growth rate in EPS in the next year, with FY21’s growth rate of 25% being the added benefit of one extra plant. As you can see below, I have changed the growth rate’s around a little, I have looked a little further out for FY19, bringing it up to 60% and assumed a little worse FY21, reducing FY20’s growth rate to just 50%. 

asx:2be tubi group

As you can see, we have approximated values that are indicating that Tubi is currently under-priced. Very encouraging, especially given my conservative assumptions and the fact that this doesn’t include the service agreement revenue.

Risks

This type of stock has several major risks associated with it and I wouldn’t recommend people even begin to start their own research, if they are not more risk tolerant than the usual. There is a plethora of articles, anecdotes and statistical evidence that show how extreme the odds are against an investor who purchases a company at its IPO.If it wasn’t for the skill of Mr. Baker, who recommended it, and the fact that this is not a capital raise, it is just an opportunity for the founder to cash in on some of the hard work he has been doing over the past 10 years, I would never have looked at it.

I have used several assumptions in my evaluation, all of which would be subject to any number of cognitive biases, confirmation, framing effect, in group etc (Feel free to pick any number from Barry's great list) all having either a negative or positive effect on the evaluation.

Whilst they do have the first movers advantage, they are reliant on the modular factory patent. If there is a way for them to either lose it or a competitor can find a way around it, they could be in a lot of trouble from the big pipe producers. They are currently working with pipe producers as opposed to competing against them, so this risk is somewhat mitigated, but if there is a big enough margin, competitors will always follow suit.

Another risk is that after they sell the unit to Iplex, the vast majority of their ongoing revenue will come from MPS Enterprises. If there was an issue either within the Oil and Gas industry or MPS, they have little to no protection.

The mobile plants take between 9 – 12 months to produce, this means that future growth, after the 4 ordered plants will come about somewhat slowly.

Marcello Russo sold his shares for just $0.20 cents each, they are currently trading at a 80% premium to this ($0.36).

This stock was suggested to me, Matt Brazier again with extremely timely advice wrote this a day or 2 later on his blog “It is ok to get investment ideas from other investors if you also thoroughly investigate these stocks independently by scrutinising primary sources. It is tempting to skimp on this process after you have been spoon fed a seemingly compelling thesis. You may earnestly attempt to do the research without realising that you are merely going through the motions. If you don't do the work properly then you don't know what you own and if you don't know that then you are asking to have your money taken off you.” This could definitely be what has happened during this analysis.

Whilst I have tried to overcome these risks with conservatism, it is almost impossible. I do however think that I have taken adequate precautions and the level of potential growth is high enough to warrant purchasing at today’s prices.

Discussion

Whilst Tubi may not yet have contracts for 2 of their ordered plants, they are starting to ramp up their operation, more specifically the number of employees. In June 2019 they filled the following positions, a Senior Operations Manager in Texas, a Technical Sales Manager in Texas and a Project Engineer based in either Sydney or Texas who will be required to spend 5 months in Texas, 5 months in Sydney and 2 months in Europe. I don’t think we should read too much in the 2 months in Europe, but clearly they are looking to expand there in the future. Right now though, they are rightfully focusing on the Permian Basin, having hired a Texas based CEO and recently moved their headquarters to Texas. Which is a smart move, as the Permian Basin is now the world’s most productive oil field.

Initially when I saw that Tubi had sold a plant to Iplex I thought that they were going down the wrong path, selling instead of renting out their modular plants. However, I now believe that they have sold this unit to Iplex because they are focusing on the Permian Basin and didn’t want to spread themselves too thin, which is great to see. I have witnessed a number of start ups (I’m not sure if this still constitutes a start-up) expand to fast, it’s as if they believe that all they need to do is expand, expand, expand and eventually they will tip over a point and everything will be fine. But during this rapid expansion, if you don’t keep a tight ship, you allow bad processes and cultures to develop (Uber for example, although if Tubi expands rapidly and gets to the same evaluation as Uber, I wouldn’t be complaining 😊). A good balance between the rapidity of growth and the time it takes to ensure that once you get big everything is set up for further growth is a tricky balancing act.

Conclusion

Tubi is an excellent company with very large insider ownership, forward orders in the bag, easily scalable, limited industry and geological specific risks (they can move anywhere and work for more industries than just oil and gas), a proven concept and a very simple business to understand. The success of these modular factories is clear, as the only two companies to have used them so far have either purchased a factory for themselves or started another contract. It doesn’t come without risks though, I do believe that the potential rewards from this company outweigh the risk, but, an investor would need to be quite risk tolerant to even consider doing their own analysis on this one, a lot of things need to come together for this thesis to pan out.

As always, thanks a lot for reading, I really appreciate all the feedback I have received so far. I have also just recently found twitter , give me a follow if you like and/or send me a msg, it’s always great to meet other ASX investors. If you don't have twitter we can connect on Linkedin .

Thanks for reading


Just Culture Investor


Trav Mays

The author is a current owner of a portion of Tubi Group, given this, they may be subject to one or a number of biases, more specifically anchoring and/or confirmation bias. This article is neither general nor personal advice and in no way constitutes specific or individual advice. The website and author do not guarantee, and accept no legal liability whatsoever arising from or connected to, the accuracy, reliability, currency or completeness of any material contained on this website or on any linked site. This website is not a substitute for independent professional advice and users should obtain any appropriate professional advice relevant to their particular circumstances. The material on this website may include the views or recommendations of third parties, which do not necessarily reflect the views of the website or author, or indicate its commitment to a particular course of action  

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